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Abstract 
Concerns over the accuracy, availability, integrity and 
continuity of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) 
have limited the integration of GPS and GLONASS for 
safety-critical applications.   More recent augmentation 
systems, such as the European Geostationary Navigation 
Overlay Service (EGNOS) and the North American Wide 
Area Augmentation System (WAAS) have begun to address 
these concerns.  Augmentation architectures build on the 
existing GPS/GLONASS infrastructures to support location-
based services in Safety of Life (SoL) applications.  Much of 
the technical development has been directed by air traffic 
management requirements, in anticipation of the more 
extensive support to be offered by GPS III and Galileo.  
WAAS has already been approved to provide vertical 
guidance against ICAO safety performance criteria for 
aviation applications.   During the next twelve months, we 
will see the full certification of EGNOS for SoL applications.  
This paper identifies strong similarities between the safety 
assessment techniques used in Europe and North America.  
Both have relied on hazard analysis techniques to derive 
estimates of the Probability of Hazardously Misleading 
Information (PHMI).  Later sections identify significant 
differences between the approaches adopted in application 
development.   Integrated fault trees have been developed by 
regulatory and commercial organisations to consider both 
infrastructure hazards and their impact on non-precision 
RNAV/VNAV approaches using WAAS.   In contrast, 
EUROCONTROL and the European Space Agency have 
developed a more modular approach to safety-case 
development for EGNOS.  It remains to be seen whether the 
European or North American strategy offers the greatest 
support as satellite based augmentation systems are used 
within a growing range of SoL applications from railway 
signalling through to Unmanned Airborne Systems.   The key 
contribution of this paper is to focus attention on the safety 
arguments that might support this wider class of location 
based services.  
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Navigational aids have been integrated into a broad range of 
safety-related applications.   For example, a recent accident 
report described the standard navigational aids on board a 
fishing vessel equipped for a crew of three, these included: a 
radar, an echo sounder, a watch keepers’ alarm and an 
autopilot. The fishing vessel also carried two GPS plotters 
and a GPS receiver (Maritime New Zealand, 2004). The 
subsequent investigation found that the vessel had run 
aground because the skipper had not set waypoints but had 
instead been using the cursor on one of the GPS plotters to 
keep an informal note of course and position.  Pilots, mariners 
and drivers have placed undue confidence in GPS and 
GLONASS applications (Johnson, Shea and Holloway, 
2008).    
 
Security concerns have also limited the integration of GNSS 
into safety-related applications.   It is relatively easy to jam 
low powered GPS transmissions.  First generation 
infrastructures lack authentication mechanisms.  This makes 
them vulnerable to spoofing through the broadcast of fake 
signals or through rebroadcast of valid GNSS signals.  Other 
problems stem from the inherent inaccuracies within first 
generation satellite-based navigation systems (Johnson and 
Atencia Yepez, 2010).  These arise from satellite geometry.   
For example, if all the satellites are closely grouped together 
then the benefits of differential signal processing will be 
reduced.  Gravitational forces create subtle changes in the 
orbit of the satellites within a GNSS constellation.  Multipath 
errors arise when the signals arriving at a receiver are 
reflected from large structures including buildings. 
Atmospheric effects are also important.  Radio waves can be 
considered to travel at the speed of light in outer space.  
However, this is reduced in the ionosphere (80-400km) where 
the ionizing effects of solar radiation form layers that refract 
electromagnetic waves from satellite transmissions.   Each 
GNSS message exchange helps to synchronize the receiver’s 
clock.  However, clock inaccuracies lead to an error of around 
2 meters with an additional 1 meter being due to rounding and 
calculation problems.    Relativistic effects can arise when 
GPS satellites move at more than 12,000 km/h relative to the 
receivers.  Time also moves more slowly in stronger 
gravitational fields and satellites are exposed to a much 
weaker gravitational force than earth-bound receivers.    
 
Regulators have responded to these concerns by placing strict 
limits on the use of GNSS in safety-related applications.  The 
International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) have 
drafted Required Navigation Performance parameters in terms 
of:  
 
• Accuracy.  How correct is the position estimate;  
• Integrity.  The largest position error that might arise 
without detection; 
• Availability.  How often can the systems be used within 
the desired levels of Accuracy and Integrity; 
• Continuity.  The probability that an operation once 
commenced can be completed. 
 
In North America, the WAAS Satellite Based Augmentation 
System has already been approved to provide vertical 
guidance against these criteria in aviation applications.   
During the next twelve months, we will see the full 
certification of EGNOS for SoL applications.  The following 
paragraphs, therefore, use these architectures to illustrate key 
concepts behind the safety of augmentation based GNSS that 
provide a stepping stone to next generation architectures, 
including Galilieo and GPS III.   
 
EGNOS uses a network of approximately 40 ground stations 
and 3 geostationary satellites.  The ground stations compare 
known information about the time and their location with the 
signals received from the satellites to derive error 
measurements.   This information is collated by four master 
stations that broadcast corrections using the geostationary 
network.   End users then apply these corrections to location 
information derived from the GPS or GLONASS networks.  
The net effect is to improve accuracy from 17-20 meters to 
around 2 meters in the augmented approach.  Continuity is 
supported by the use of redundancy; each of the four master 
stations rotates from being active to serve as either hot or 
cold-back-up.    The WAAS architecture exploits a similar 
combination of ground stations and satellite correction 
broadcasts with similar improvements in horizontal and 
vertical accuracy. 
 
 
 
Fig, 1: Integrity Threats to SBAS (Ack: Fernow, 2005) 
2. Safety-Assessments for GNSS Infrastructures 
The Probability of Hazardously Misleading Information 
(PHMI) is an important metric for the certification of 
augmentation systems (Blanch, Walter and Enge, 2007).  This 
measures the likelihood that the information contained in a 
navigation message leads to a position error larger than a 
particular error bound, known as the protection level. The 
Safety of Life (SoL) user can then assess the risk that the 
accuracy falls below the threshold and hence can help them to 
determine whether or not it is ‘safe’ to rely on location 
services.   For instance, the FAA maintains that WAAS will 
alert aircrew within 6-8 seconds, depending on the airborne 
equipment, whenever the input signal for positioning becomes 
unusable.  The PHMI must be less than 1E-07 for the 
specified vertical and horizontal protection levels (FAA, 
2010).   Figure 1 provides an overview of the various sources 
of error in SBAS architectures, including signal errors from 
the space based components through to hardware and 
software failures on the ground based segments.  Mitigations 
must be introduced to ensure that the SBAS infrastructure 
remains within the PHMI limits established by the regulators. 
 
2.1 Analysing Error Distributions   
The safety assessment for SBAS architectures has been driven 
by a need to over-bound, range error distributions.  As 
mentioned, EGNOS and WAAS rely on ground stations to 
estimate satellite ranging errors that are then used to 
broadcast corrections to mobile users. These corrections 
cannot easily anticipate errors that have a different impact on 
the fixed ground stations compared with mobile end users.  
The SBAS, therefore, also broadcasts confidence limits on 
navigation accuracy that try to over-bound these less 
predictable errors.   End-users apply this information to 
calculate an ‘error buffer’ around their estimated location.  
The calculation of the confidence interval falls into two 
different tasks. First, it is necessary to identify the core of the 
error distribution that represents possible biases under routine 
operations.  Secondly, it is necessary to identify the tails of 
the distribution.  These small probabilities are in the order of 
10-7 (Rife, Walter and Blanch, 2004).  They represent 
receiver dependent errors that are the result of less predictable 
effects including ionospheric and tropospheric gradients, 
radio interference etc.   
 
Computing range error distributions is complicated by a lack 
of operational data.  Regulatory organisations have, therefore, 
commissioned studies to gather evidence about the core and 
the tails of the error distributions experienced by aviation 
users.  Further problems arise because it is hard to distinguish 
between different sources of error in direct observations.    
This is necessary to determine which hazards can be predicted 
during particular operational conditions.  If a source of error 
can be anticipated then mitigations can be introduced to 
exclude it from the PHMI. The WAAS PHMI cannot be 
averaged over conditions that are unknown but constant or 
repeatable over time (Blanch, Walter and Enge, 2007).  In 
addition, the WAAS teams used analytical techniques to 
characterise the tails of the error distribution.  This introduced 
elements of subjectivity; domain experts had to identify the 
threat mechanisms that could contribute to low probability 
events.  The limited amount of direct data meant that 
extrapolation was used throughout the analysis.   The 
resulting threat models covered ionospheric errors, 
tropospheric delays, multipath issues etc.  The intention was 
to place a bound on the worst case impact of these threats and 
to assign probabilities to them. 
 
2.2 Risk Assessments 
In addition to the position and range errors from secondary 
effects, such as tropospheric gradients, it was also necessary 
to identify the failure modes that might affect WAAS and 
EGNOS architectures.  These included software bugs as well 
as hardware/processor failures for the ground based stations.   
In both the United States and in Europe, Failure Modes 
Effects Analysis was used to support hazard identification. 
Fault Trees then helped to assess mitigations.  There are, 
however, contrasts between the safety assessment methods 
used in both projects.   For example, the EGNOS 
development team took steps to mitigate human errors that 
might lead to a loss of integrity (Johnson and Atencia Yepez, 
2010).  The WAAS team did not explicitly include 
maintenance failures within their systems level fault tree 
analysis; “WAAS design is such that the WAAS operator and 
maintainer cannot cause HMI”  (Fernow, 2005).  These risk 
assessments were supported by the static analysis of PHMI 
algorithms.  These studies identified a number of what the 
EGNOS team termed ‘feared events’ and the WAAS groups 
called ‘system threats’ (Fernow, 2005).    Threat models and 
detection algorithms were developed for each of the hazards.  
These were then used to drive an estimation of their 
contribution to the PHMI.   
 
 2.3 Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) provides 
techniques for mitigating many of the hazards that can arise 
for GNSS architectures.  Europe Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) requirements AMC 20-4 and JAA TGL10 as well as 
the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO’s) 
Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) Manual, Doc 9613 
have encouraged the use RAIM when satellite based systems 
provide primary navigation aids. RAIM detects faults with 
redundant GNSS measurements. Additional signals that are 
not used in calculating the receiver’s location, for instance 
from other satellites arrays, are used to confirm the fixes 
derived from the main system.   In the Galileo architecture, 
RAIM techniques can be used to exclude data from satellites 
that provide unreliable signals. This is not, typically, possible 
in augmentation systems that have less control over the 
underlying satellite networks. EGNOS and WAAS assume 
fault free performance from the GPS/GLONASS constellation 
in calculating the protection level.  In the case of EGNOS, 
these satellites are outside the control of the immediate 
infrastructure operators.  However, the system assurance and 
monitoring techniques described in previous sections offer a 
level of confidence that justifies the omission of RAIM within 
these SBAS core architectures. 
 
RAIM techniques can, however, be introduced by the end 
users of EGNOS and WAAS services.   Reliability tests are 
conducted in real time on the aircraft to validate satellite 
signals against model predictions.  Detection, Identification 
and Adaptation procedures can be used to locate outliers and 
anomalies in the range measurements that may then be 
excluded or used to indicate problems in the calculated 
position.   From the users’ perspective RAIM services can be 
directly integrated into existing navigation systems.  They can 
also assist pilots to plan around periods of reduced GNSS 
availability.   In critical phases of flight, such as an approach, 
the pilot needs to be informed of such inaccuracies as soon as 
possible so that they can determine whether or not to perform 
a go-around manoeuvre etc (Oliveira and Tiberius, 2008).   
 
2.4 WAAS and Process Based Safety Assurance 
The application of risk assessment and mitigation techniques 
has been supported by process based approaches to system 
safety.  This was embodied within the Safety Assurance 
Requirements Process (SARP) of the WAAS programme.   
The SARP was supported by the application of a range of 
process based standards, including RTCA DO-178B.   These 
assurance processes were developed in response to earlier 
criticisms from the US Government Accountability Office 
(2000) .  The GAO identified a need for greater supervision 
and audit across the WAAS initiative.   The requirements 
process provided guidelines for the peer and external reviews 
that were intended to ensure the system architecture and 
design mitigated the PHMI related hazards.   The key inputs 
to SARP were documents including, but not limited to, the 
detailed plans that described how various software and 
hardware standards would be applied within the project.   
They also included specifications, requirements and design 
documents for sub-systems and the meta-level architectural 
components as well as system safety assessments, component 
implementation guides, system integration documentations 
and the outcome of acceptance testing (FAA, 2005).   
 
A series of assertions were developed to characterise both 
internal and external failure modes within the WAAS 
architecture.   External assertions stemmed from reliability 
requirements for the GPS infrastructure.   These were of 
obvious concern not only to the FAA but also to 
EUROCONTROL and the European Space Agency (ESA) as 
they sought to develop EGNOS on top of the same GPS 
architecture.  The exchange of WAAS information about 
common failure modes had to be mediated with the US 
Department of Defence via an Interagency Forum for 
Operational Requirements (IFOR).  The internal assertions 
identified by the WAAS teams included proprietary 
information.   This related to the implementation techniques 
used by contractors.  Proprietary concerns, therefore, created 
some additional barriers to the exchange of integrity lessons 
between WAAS and EGNOS. 
 
The process-based approach to safety assurance within the 
WAAS programme used a wide range of additional 
techniques.   The analysis of the PHMI algorithms was 
supported by an assessment of input-output relationships for 
the processors used within the ground based segments.  
Timings were verified using latency analysis.  These diverse 
analytical techniques were essential given the reliance on 
software components and stochastic systems that could not be 
‘completely’ verified using exhaustive testing techniques.    
 
One of the most significant differences between the European 
and North American approaches was the degree of integration 
between the infrastructure safety assessments and those that 
were developed at the application level.  EUROCONTROL 
worked with ESA to introduce a degree of separation between 
these complementary activities.  In contrast, the FAA 
supported a more bottom-up approach in which there was a 
close integration between the safety assessments on the 
infrastructure and those that guided the development of initial 
aviation applications.   Raytheon drove the initial 
infrastructure analysis that led to the identification of the 
assertions, mentioned in previous paragraphs.  These were 
then used to support the development of more detailed 
application-level fault trees.  These diagrams were then 
reviewed by the FAA and their subcontractors.   The 
reliability analysis focused on non-precision, Lateral 
Navigation (LNAV) and Vertical Navigation (VNAV) 
approaches. LNAV approaches tend to involve ‘non-
precision’ incremental descents rather than following a fixed 
glide slope with electronic slope guidance down to a decision 
altitude.  The LNAV accuracy required by the FAA was 
greater than or equal to 36 meters with a PHMI of less than 1 x 
10-7 per hour. 
 
The drafting of fault trees that capture both infrastructure and 
application hazards reflects close cooperation between 
WAAS infrastructure developers and system integrators.   
The hazard analysis for LNAC and NVAN approaches 
directly supported SBAS avionics development following 
DO-229C, TSO-C145/146.   A similar approach was adopted 
during the development of SBAS localizer performance with 
vertical guidance (LPV). These rely on GNSS receivers at 
airports without Instrument Landing Systems.  Pilots use 
WAAS to descend under vertical guidance to decision 
altitudes as low as 250 feet above the runway.   This 
illustrates a further important feature of WAAS development.  
‘In service’ experience has been used to justify changes in the 
safety assessments. In March 2006, some three years after the 
initial LPV certification, the FAA extended its operation 
down to decision altitudes as low as 200 feet above the 
runway.  
 
EGNOS and the Role of Safety Cases 
Previous sections have identified the similarities that exist in 
the safety assurance processes behind both the EGNOS and 
WAAS SBAS programmes.   Both have used process based 
techniques that are consistent with existing aviation 
development standards to structure the integration of model 
based analysis with limited operational data.  However, it is 
possible to identify significant differences in the approaches 
that have been adopted in Europe and North America.   As we 
have seen, there was a tight integration between infrastructure 
and application development within the US programme.   
This was an inevitable consequence both of the pioneering 
nature of the augmentation system but also arguably was a 
consequence of the influence exerted by critical GAO reports.   
These had urged closer oversight and cooperation to ensure 
the delivery of usable systems within the WAAS programme 
(GAO, 2000).   In other work we have reviewed the 
unintended technical consequences of such political and 
administrative interventions (Johnson, 2009).   In contrast, the 
European initiatives developed a more modular approach 
based around safety cases.  This was intended to simplify the 
future application of EGNOS to a wide range of applications. 
The safety case structures the technical documentation that 
demonstrates compliance with both ICAO and the EC Single 
European Skies requirements.  Figure 2 shows how the 
EGNOS safety arguments have been separated into several 
components. 
 
 
 
Part A: 
Design, Development and 
Deployment 
(Prepared by: EC, ESA etc). 
 
Part B: 
Operations and 
Maintenance 
(Prepared by: ESSP). 
 
EGNOS Infrastructure Safety Case 
 
Application Safety Case 1: 
Eg SES integration for en-
route approaches to non-
precision approaches 
(Prepared by: ESSP). 
 
Application Safety Case 2: 
Eg Localizer Performance 
with Vertical Guidance 
approaches. 
(Prepared by: 
 Individual ANSPs) 
 
Figure 2: Overview of the EGNOS Safety Case Structure for 
Air Traffic Management 
 
Part A: EGNOS Design Safety Case explains why the 
system has been ‘designed, developed and deployed’ in a 
manner compliant to ICAO Standards and Recommended 
Practices (SARPS).   This part was coordinated by the EC 
with support from the European Space Agency as the lead 
body in the initial design of the EGNOS architecture.  It 
resembles many elements of the internal and external safety 
assessments developed during the initial WAAS programme. 
 
Part B: Operations Safety Case provides further arguments 
and evidence to show that the EGNOS system will be 
operated and maintained to meet the requirements identified 
in Part A.  The commercial operator for the augmentation 
system, European Satellite Services Provider (ESSP), is 
responsible for this component of the supporting 
documentation.  Elements of this safety argument are covered 
within the internal safety assessments for the US WAAS 
programme.  The EGNOS Part B safety case also builds on 
monitoring techniques that resemble those used in North 
America.  Operational studies continue to provide evidence of 
conformance to ICAO Required Navigation Performance.   
The in-space monitoring was coordinated by 
EUROCONTROL, firstly by reviewing the existing EGNOS 
datasets and then by harmonizing the aggregation of the 
available performance data. Their concern was not simply to 
demonstrate performance levels using optimal equipment but 
to assess integrity, availability etc replicating a ‘minimally 
equipped’ aviation user at different locations in the EGNOS 
service area (ESA, 2009). 
 
Application Safety Cases.   Parts A and B provide the 
arguments that the EGNOS infrastructure will be acceptably 
safe for integration within European Air Traffic Management.   
Additional safety cases are then required for each of the 
applications that are built on top of this architecture.  ESSP 
are responsible for developing safety arguments that support 
the integration of EGNOS information during en-route 
operations and non-precision approaches.   The aim of each 
application safety case is to demonstrate that the target level 
of safety can be met.  This is done by demonstrating that the 
safety of EGNOS applications will be at least equivalent to 
those GPS-based operations that have already been approved. 
 
The EGNOS approach can also be illustrated by LPV 
approaches.   As mentioned, these are similar to conventional 
Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) with the addition of GNSS 
receivers.  Within the EGNOS certification process, it is the 
responsibility of individual Air Navigation Service Providers 
(ANSP) to develop the safety cases that justify the use of 
these technologies for particular approaches.   This illustrates 
a second explanation for the modular approach adopted by the 
European application of SBAS within Air Traffic 
Management.   Differences between the Standard Operating 
Procedures and technical infrastructures provided by different 
member states create particular problems in developing a 
single safety argument that could be used across all nations.  
 
 
Part A: 
Design, Development and 
Deployment 
(Prepared by: EC, ESA etc). 
 
Part B: 
Operations and 
Maintenance 
(Prepared by: ESSP). 
 
EGNOS Infrastructure Safety Case 
Application Safety  
Case 1: 
SES integration for en-
route approaches to 
non-precision 
approaches 
(Prepared by: ESSP). 
Application 
Safety Case 2.1: 
Localizer 
Performance with 
Vertical Guidance 
approaches. 
(Prepared by: 
ANSP X) 
Application Generic  
Safety Case 2: 
Localizer Performance with 
Vertical Guidance approaches. 
(Prepared by: 
EUROCONTROL) 
Application Safety 
Case 2.2: 
Localizer 
Performance with 
Vertical Guidance 
approaches. 
(Prepared by: 
ANSP Y) 
Application 
Safety Case 3: 
Localizer 
Performance 
with Vertical 
Guidance 
approaches. 
(Prepared by: 
ANSP Z) 
 
Figure 3: EGNOS Safety Case Structure 
 
There is a danger that member states may use inconsistent and 
potentially contradictory arguments in their various safety 
cases.  There is no guarantee that hazards mitigated by one 
ANSP will be addressed in the same way by a neighbouring 
service provider.  EUROCONTROL have, therefore, 
developed a generic argument for Approach Procedures with 
Vertical guidance (APV) using EGNOS.  This high-level 
safety case is intended to provide a template for member 
states and is illustrated in Figure 3 (Johnson and Atencia 
Yepez, 2010).  Individual service providers, shown as ANSP 
X and ANSP Y, must instantiate the generic safety case for 
their own operating environment.   Figure 3 also shows that 
other Service Providers, illustrated as ANSP Z, may reject the 
template and instead construct their safety arguments directly 
on top of the safety cases developed by ESA and ESSP.    
 
Figure 3 raises further concerns. The development of modular 
safety cases implies that any underlying weaknesses in 
EGNOS parts A or B will be propagated into the applications 
that depend upon them.   ANSP X and Y must trust the 
arguments used for the two underlying levels.  The 
architecture illustrated in Figure 3 assumes that any SBAS 
hazards will be adequately addressed by arguments in Parts A 
or B.  However, it may also be possible to introduce 
additional protection into the application level safety cases.   
This will be difficult when many of the hazards addressed in 
lower levels of the argumentation structure may not be visible 
to the engineers working on end-user development.  The 
WAAS approach avoids some of these concerns because the 
same contractors helped to develop safety arguments for the 
infrastructure and applications. 
 
There is a danger that the safety managers who develop the 
arguments used to justify higher level applications may not 
accurately understand the evidence or constraints that limit 
claims about the safety of underlying infrastructures.   There 
is some confusion amongst GNSS users about the integrity 
concepts that support augmentation systems.   This creates 
significant concerns when the properties of those 
implementations have a profound impact on reliability 
attributes.   These communication problems were minimised 
during WAAS development because the GAO reports urged 
closer and closer integration between infrastructure and 
application development.  External and internal assertions 
were accurately embedded within the integrated WAAS fault 
trees.  The boundaries between safety arguments are seldom 
as clear as they might seem in Figures 2 and 3.  In practice, it 
is likely that the generic and application level safety 
arguments will make reference to evidence used in lower 
levels of the infrastructure safety cases.  This creates concerns 
about common vulnerabilities where the refutation of a 
particular non-functional requirement or assertion would 
undermine safety arguments across all of the components 
illustrated in these high-level architectures.    
 
A final area of concern for both the WAAS and EGNOS 
approaches is that SBAS are intended to support a wide range 
of applications.  The previous development of these 
infrastructures has been tailored towards aviation 
applications.  In consequence, many of the concerns over 
consistency in the case of EGNOS and of modularity/reuse in 
the case of WAAS can be overcome through a myriad of 
personal, professional and regulatory connections between the 
infrastructure operators and end users.   The next six months 
will see the extension of EGNOS support to SoL applications 
well beyond the aviation examples cited in this paper.   It 
remains to be seen whether the threats and hazards, the 
constraints and assertions that have informed existing safety 
arguments will be adequately considered by end users in 
everything from rail transportation through search and rescue 
applications to the process industries.  The EGNOS SoL 
infrastructure will only enter into service during the second 
half of 2010.  We, therefore, lack direct operational evidence 
about the commonality and differences between the safety 
arguments required in different application domains. It is 
difficult to determine whether or not the safety arguments will 
be different between various Air Navigation Service 
Providers.    Previous studies have shown that significant 
differences arise from the mitigations that can be used to 
address potential hazards from the failure of SBAS systems 
(Johnson and Atencia Yepez, 2010).  For example, ground 
based safety net applications that exist in some countries are 
not available in neighboring countries or even in other regions 
within the same state.  Only the future will tell whether these 
differences within the field of Air Traffic Safety Management 
are even more marked in the safety cases that support SBAS 
applications across other industries. 
 
3. Conclusions  
Concerns over the accuracy, availability, integrity and 
continuity of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) 
have limited the integration of GPS and GLONASS for 
safety-critical applications.   More recent augmentation 
systems, such as the European Geostationary Navigation 
Overlay Service (EGNOS) and North American Wide Area 
Augmentation System (WAAS) address these concerns.  
Augmentation architectures build on the existing 
GPS/GLONASS infrastructures to support location-based 
services in Safety of Life (SoL) applications.  This paper has 
identified strong similarities between the safety assessment 
techniques used in Europe and North America.  Both have 
relied on hazard analysis techniques to derive numerical 
estimates for the Probability of Hazardously Misleading 
Information (PHMI).     
 
This paper has also identified differences between the 
approaches adopted in application development.   Integrated 
Fault Trees have been developed to consider both 
infrastructure hazards and their impact on non-precision 
RNAV/VNAV approaches using WAAS.   This approach has 
been facilitated by close cooperation between the FAA and 
their sub-contractors, in response to criticism from the GAO.   
However, problems can arise when proprietary information is 
embedded within the safety assertions that support the 
internal design of SBAS.  It may be difficult to provide 
competitors with the same level of detail as they try to extend 
the application of WAAS into further application areas.   
National security concerns also limit the exchange of external 
reliability information with the EGNOS development teams. 
 
EGNOS applications have been supported by a more modular 
approach to safety-case development.  This is intended to 
reduce complexity.  Developers can build upon the 
infrastructure safety analysis without necessarily following 
every aspect of the underlying safety cases.   This approach 
also supports the development of generic safety arguments by 
EUROCONTROL that can then be instantiated by individual 
Air Traffic Management organisations in different European 
states.  However, problems can arise when operational 
insights and lessons learned might not be communicated back 
to the agencies that maintain the underlying safety cases.   
Further problems stem from the maintenance of appropriate 
interfaces between modular safety cases when application 
concerns may rely on detailed timing issues in the underlying 
infrastructure. 
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